Usually, Safe Boot prevents the UEFI from working all subsequent recordsdata until they bear a digital signature certifying these recordsdata are trusted by the machine maker. The exploit bypasses this safety by injecting shell code stashed in a malicious bitmap picture displayed by the UEFI through the boot-up course of. The injected code installs a cryptographic key that digitally indicators a malicious GRUB file together with a backdoored picture of the Linux kernel, each of which run throughout later levels of the boot course of on Linux machines.
The silent set up of this key induces the UEFI to deal with the malicious GRUB and kernel picture as trusted elements, and thereby bypass Safe Boot protections. The ultimate result’s a backdoor slipped into the Linux kernel earlier than some other safety defenses are loaded.
Diagram illustrating the execution stream of the LogoFAIL exploit Binarly discovered within the wild.
Credit score:
Binarly
In a web-based interview, HD Moore, CTO and co-founder at runZero and an skilled in firmware-based malware, defined the Binarly report this manner:
The Binarly paper factors to somebody utilizing the LogoFAIL bug to configure a UEFI payload that bypasses safe boot (firmware) by tricking the firmware into accepting their self-signed key (which is then saved within the firmware because the MOK variable). The evil code remains to be restricted to the user-side of UEFI, however the LogoFAIL exploit does allow them to add their very own signing key to the firmware’s enable record (however doesn’t infect the firmware in any means in any other case).
It is nonetheless successfully a GRUB-based kernel backdoor versus a firmware backdoor, but it surely does abuse a firmware bug (LogoFAIL) to permit set up with out person interplay (enrolling, rebooting, then accepting the brand new MOK signing key).
In a standard safe boot setup, the admin generates an area key, makes use of this to signal their up to date kernel/GRUB packages, tells the firmware to enroll the important thing they made, then after reboot, the admin has to just accept this new key through the console (or remotely through bmc/ipmi/ilo/drac/and many others bios console).
On this setup, the attacker can change the known-good GRUB + kernel with a backdoored model by enrolling their very own signing key with out person interplay through the LogoFAIL exploit, but it surely’s nonetheless successfully a GRUB-based bootkit, and does not get hardcoded into the BIOS firmware or something.
Machines susceptible to the exploit embody some fashions bought by Acer, HP, Fujitsu, and Lenovo once they ship with a UEFI developed by producer Insyde and run Linux. Proof discovered within the exploit code signifies the exploit could also be tailor-made for particular {hardware} configurations of such machines. Insyde issued a patch earlier this 12 months that forestalls the exploit from working. Unpatched units stay susceptible. Units from these producers that use non-Insyde UEFIs aren’t affected.
